













Inarecentpaper, Weintraub, Benkard, andVanRoy(2008b)proposeanapproximationmethodforanalyzing
Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style dynamic models of imperfect competition. In that paper, we deﬁned a
new notion of equilibrium, oblivious equilibrium (henceforth, OE), in which each ﬁrm is assumed to make
decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the long-run average industry state, but where ﬁrms
ignore current information about competitors’ states. The great advantage of OE is that they are much
easier to compute than are Markov perfect equilibria (henceforth, MPE). Moreover, we showed that an OE
provides meaningful approximations of long-run Markov perfect dynamics of an industry with many ﬁrms
if, alongside some technical requirements, the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrm states obeys certain “light-tail
condition”.
To facilitate using OE in practice, in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008a) we provide a computa-
tional algorithm for solving for OE, and approximation bounds that can be computed to provide researchers
with a numerical measure of how close OE is to MPE in their particular application. We also provided com-
putational evidence supporting the conclusion that OE often yields good approximations of MPE behavior
for industries like those that empirical researchers would like to study.
While our computational results suggest that OE will be useful in many applications on its own, we
believe that a major contribution of OE will be as a starting point with which to build even better approxi-
mations. As a matter of fact, in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008a) we extended our base model as
well as algorithms for computing OE and error bounds to incorporate aggregate shocks common to all ﬁrms.
1Such an extension is important, for example, when analyzing the dynamic effects of industry-wide business
cycles.
In this paper we introduce another important extension to OE. OE offers a way to approximate long-
run Markov perfect industry dynamics with many ﬁrms, and it could be used if one is interested in long-
run economic indicators, such as long-run average investment. These quantities are independent of the
initial state of the industry. In other cases, one may be interested in the short-run dynamic behavior of
an industry starting from a given initial condition. For example, one may want to asses how an industry
would evolve over a few years after a policy or environmental change. With this motivation, we introduce
a nonstationary notion of OE in which every ﬁrm knows the industry state in the initial period but does
not update this knowledge after that point. We call this new equilibrium concept, nonstationary oblivious
equilibrium (henceforth, NOE). NOE is based on the same idea as oblivious equilibrium but it offers a way
to approximate short-run transitional dynamics that may result, for example, from shocks or policy changes.
The model and assumptions in this paper are the same as in Section 3 of Weintraub, Benkard, and Van
Roy (2008b). For the sake of completeness, we present the model in the Appendix.
In Section 2 we deﬁne nonstationary oblivious equilibrium (henceforth, NOE). Moreover, in our com-
putational experiments we focus on NOE that become stationary as time progresses. In Section 2 we also
show that under mild technical conditions such NOE exist. In the following sections we present algorithms
and results for NOE in a similar spirit to those presented in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008b) and
Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008a) for OE.
In Section 3 we provide an algorithm to compute NOE that become stationary as time progresses. The
algorithm is computationally efﬁcient; it can compute NOE in few minutes even for industries with hundreds
of ﬁrms.
In Section 4 we provide an efﬁcient simulation-based algorithm to compute a bound on approximation
error. Errorhereismeasuredintermsoftheexpectedincrementalvaluethatanindividualﬁrmintheindustry
can capture by unilaterally deviating from the NOE strategy. The algorithm for bounding approximation
error allow us to verify accuracy of NOE as an approximation for each problem instance.
In Section 5 we provide a computational study and, using the error bounds, show that NOE offers useful
approximations for relevant models of industries with hundreds or even tens of ﬁrms. We also show that
NOE can endogenously generate industry dynamics, like industry shake-outs, similar to those observed in
data sets. Our results show that by using NOE it is possible to further expand the set of dynamic industries
that can be analyzed computationally.
While the previous results provide support for using NOE in practice, in Section 6 we provide an asymp-
2totic result that provides a theoretical justiﬁcation for the approximation. We show that, if alongside some
technical requirements, the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrm states obeys certain “light-tail” condition, then
the approximation error vanishes as the market sizes grows. We note that important parts of the proof of this
result require different techniques to the ones used in its analog theorem for OE in Weintraub, Benkard, and
Van Roy (2008b).
Finally, in Section 7 we provide conclusions and some thoughts for future research.
2 Nonstationary Oblivious Equilibrium
Oblivious equilibrium, offers a way to approximate long-run Markov perfect industry dynamics. In this
section we introduce a new equilibrium concept, nonstationary oblivious equilibrium, that can be used to
approximate the short-run dynamic behavior of an industry starting from an initial state of interest.
Recall that an oblivious equilibrium was based on the idea that when there are a large number of ﬁrms
(and no aggregate shocks), simultaneous changes in individual ﬁrm quality levels can average out such that
in the long-run the industry state remains roughly constant over time. Based on a similar idea we introduce
a method to approximate the short-run behavior of an industry that starts from a given state of interest. If
there are a large number of ﬁrms (and no aggregate shocks), the industry state starting from a given initial
state roughly follows a deterministic trajectory. In this setting, each ﬁrm can make near-optimal decisions
based only on its own quality level and by knowing the deterministic trajectory followed by the industry
state. With this motivation, we consider restricting ﬁrm strategies so that each ﬁrm’s decisions depend only
on the ﬁrm’s quality level and the time period. We call such restricted strategies nonstationary oblivious
since they involve decisions made without full knowledge of the circumstances — in particular, the state
of the industry. Note that nonstationary oblivious strategies differ from oblivious strategies because they
depend on the time period. To simplify notation we assume that the industry is at the initial state of interest
at time period t = 0.
2.1 Nonstationary Oblivious Strategies and Entry Rate Functions
Let ~ Mns = ~ M1  M1 and ~ ns = ~ 1  1 denote the set of nonstationary oblivious strategies and
the set of nonstationary oblivious entry rate functions.1 A nonstationary oblivious strategy is a sequence
1Recall that ~ M  M and ~    denote the set of oblivious strategies and the set of oblivious entry rate functions; M and 
are the set of Markov strategies and the set of entry rate functions (see Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008b)). The set X
1 is
the inﬁnite cross product of X, i.e. X
1 = X  X  X:::.
3of oblivious strategies. Hence, if  2 ~ Mns is a nonstationary oblivious strategy, then  = f0;1;:::g,
where for each time period t  0, t 2 ~ M is an oblivious strategy. For example, if ﬁrm i uses strategy
 2 ~ Mns then at time period t, ﬁrm i takes action t(xit), where xit is the state of ﬁrm i at time t (so the
action depends both on the time period and the state). In a NOE ﬁrms will make decisions assuming that
the industry state evolves deterministically. Moreover, ﬁrms will assume the industry state at time period t
is the expected industry state after t time periods of evolution given the competitors’ strategy and starting
from the industry state of interest. Therefore, under this assumption, the time period determines the industry
state.
A nonstationary oblivious entry rate function is a sequence of oblivious entry rate functions. Hence,
if  2 ~ ns is a nonstationary oblivious entry rate function, then  = f0;1;:::g where for every period
t  0, t is real-valued.
2.2 Nonstationary Oblivious Equilibrium
Note that if all ﬁrms use a common strategy  2 ~ Mns, the quality level of each evolves as an independent
transient non-homogenous Markov chain. Let the transition sub-probabilities of this transient Markov chain
for period t be denoted by Pt(x;y). If there were an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms, though each evolves stochas-
tically, the percentage of ﬁrms that transition from any given quality level to another would be deterministic.
Similarly, the percentage of ﬁrms that exit would be deterministic. Motivated by this fact, for  2 ~ Mns,
 2 ~ ns, and s 2 S we deﬁne the following sequence of industry states:





y2N Pt(y;x)~ st(y) + t if x = xe
P
y2N Pt(y;x)~ st(y) otherwise;
where ~ s0 = s 2 S. Note that ~ st is the expected industry state at time t given strategy  and it can be easily
computed by matrix multiplication. For all x 2 N, we let ~ s(;;s);t(x) = ~ st(x), where for all t  0, ~ st(x) is
given by equation (2.1).
For nonstationary oblivious strategies 0; 2 ~ Mns, a nonstationary oblivious entry rate function  2
~ ns, and an initial industry state s, we deﬁne a nonstationary oblivious value function for period t
(2.2)








 xit = x
#
:
4This value function should be interpreted as the expected net present value of a ﬁrm that is at quality level
x at time t and follows nonstationary oblivious strategy 0, under the assumption that, for all t  0, its
competitors’ state will be given by ~ s(;;s);t at time t. Note that even though the ﬁrm’s state trajectory only
depends on the ﬁrm’s own strategy 0, the nonstationary oblivious value function remains a function of the
competitors’ strategy  and the entry rate  through the expected industry state trajectory ~ s(;;s);. We abuse
notation by using ~ Vt(xj;;s)  ~ Vt(xj;;;s) to refer to the nonstationary oblivious value function when
ﬁrm i follows the same strategy  as its competitors.
We now deﬁne a new solution concept. To avoid pathological behavior in which an entry rate grows
unboundedly large and is followed by massive exit, we restrict all entry rates to be less than a predetermined
upper bound max  supx;s (x;s)=(1   ) + . We introduce the following assumption that is kept
throughout the paper unless otherwise explicitly noted:2
Assumption 2.1. ~  = [0;max].
An s nonstationary oblivious equilibrium consists of a strategy  2 ~ Mns and an entry rate function
 2 ~ ns that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Firm strategies optimize a nonstationary oblivious value function:
(2.3) sup
02 ~ Mns
~ V0(xj0;;;s) = ~ V0(xj;;s); 8x 2 N:
2. At every period of time, the nonstationary oblivious expected value of entry is zero or boundary
conditions are satisﬁed. For all t  0,
t 2 (0;max) implies  ~ Vt+1(xej;;s)    = 0
 ~ Vt+1(xej;;s)    < 0 implies t = 0
 ~ Vt+1(xej;;s)    > 0 implies t = max :
Note that the optimization of ~ V0 implies, by dynamic programming principles, that ﬁrms optimize ~ Vt for all
t  0.
In this paper, we focus on NOE that become stationary as time progresses. That is, we focus on NOE
(;) 2 ~ Mns  ~ ns that converge to an OE (~ ; ~ ) 2 ~ M  ~  as time progresses in the following sense:
2It is simple to show that an OE entry rate must be smaller than max. Moreover, in our computational experiments we never
observed NOE entry rates growing unboundedly large and they were always much smaller than max. For this reason and to
simplify the explanation, max is omitted in the description of the algorithm in Section 3. We make use of max, however, in the
existence proof that follows.
5for all x 2 N, limt!1 t(x) = ~ (x), and limt!1 t = ~ . In the next subsection, we show the existence of
such NOE.
2.3 Existence of NOE that Become Stationary
By Assumptions A.1 and A.2, investments and expected discounted proﬁts are uniformly bounded over all
states by ^  and supx;s (x;s)=(1   ) + , respectively. Therefore, with out loss of generality, we restrict
the range of  2 ~ M to [0;^ ]  [0;supx;s (x;s)=(1   ) + ].
We introduce the following additional assumption.
Assumption 2.2. For all i 2 N and t 2 N, xit  xmax.
Assumption2.2impliesthatalltheanalysiscanberestrictedtotheﬁnitespaceofqualitylevelsf0;:::;xmaxg.
We deﬁne the set of converging nonstationary strategies and entry rate functions:
^ Mns = f 2 ~ Mns : for which there exists  2 ~ M; such that, for all x; lim
t!1
t(x) = (x)g ;
^ ns = f 2 ~ ns : for which there exists  2 ~ ; such that, lim
t!1
t = g :
We endowed this sets with the metric compatible with the product topology.
The following is the main result of this section. The proof is provided in the Appendix.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose Assumptions A.1, A.2, A.3, 2.1, and 2.2 hold. Then, there exists a NOE (;) 2
^ Mns  ^ ns. Moreover, for all x, limt!1 t(x) = ~ (x) and limt!1 t = ~ , where (~ ; ~ ) 2 ~ M  ~  is an
OE.
3 Algorithm to Compute NOE
We propose an algorithm to compute NOE that become stationary and converge to OE. We impose this form
of convergence in the algorithm and then solve backwards. In this way, the problem of ﬁnding a NOE is
reduced to a ﬁnite horizon problem.
Suppose we are mostly interested in the behavior of the industry in the interval between time periods
t = 0 and t = T. Let ~ V ; ~ ; ~ ; ~ s be a (stationary) OE value function, strategy, entry rate, and expected state,
respectively. Let T := minftjt T ~ V (xe+tw)  g, where  > 0 is a predetermined precision. We assume
there is a ﬁnite time horizon of length T, and that after T the NOE coincides with an OE. More speciﬁcally,
6for all t > T, t = ~ , t = ~ , and ~ st = ~ s. In addition, for t > T, ﬁrms garner proﬁts according to the OE
value function. This simpliﬁcation should not have a signiﬁcant impact on the behavior of the industry for
the time periods of interest between t = 0 and t = T. After this reduction computing a NOE is simple; it
requires solving ﬁnite-horizon one-dimensional dynamic programming problems.
At each iteration of the algorithm, we (1) compute the strategies that maximize the nonstationary obliv-
ious value functions (step 10) and (2) we compute new entry rates depending on the extent of the violation
of the zero-proﬁt conditions (step 16). Strategies and entry rates are updated “smoothly” (steps 20 and 21).
The parameters N1, N2, 
1, and 
2 are set after some experimentation to speed up convergence.
If  = 0;0 = 0 and the termination condition of the outer loop is satisﬁed with 1 = 2 = 0, we have
an s nonstationary oblivious equilibrium. Small values of 0, 1, and 2 allow for small errors associated
with limitations of numerical precision.
Algorithm 1 s Nonstationary Oblivious Equilibrium Solver
1: t := ~ , for all t.
2: t := ~ , for all t.
3: Deﬁne ~ VT+1(xj;;;s) := ~ V (x), for all x , , and .
4: n := 1.
5: repeat
6: Compute ~ s(;;s);t for t 2 f0;:::;Tg.
7: 0 := 0; 1 := 0.
8: t := T.
9: repeat
10: Choose 
t 2 ~ M to maximize ~ Vt(xj;;;s) simultaneously for all x.
11:  t =  ~ Vt+1(xej;;;s))   
12: 0 = max(0; t).
13: if t > 0 then
14: 1 = max(1;  t).
15: end if
16: 
t := t( ~ Vt+1(xej;;;s))=.
17: Let t := t   1.
18: until t = 0.
19: 2 :=k     k1.
20:  :=  + (   )=(n
1 + N1).
21:  :=  + (   )=(n
2 + N2).
22: n := n + 1.
23: until 0  1 and 1  1 and 2  2.
We use an s nonstationary oblivious equilibrium to approximate short-run behavior of an industry that
starts from a given initial state s. In the next section, we provide error bounds that are useful to asses the
accuracy of the approximation for any given applied problem.
74 Error Bounds
We derive error bounds in this section. To bound approximation error, we ﬁrst deﬁne what is meant by
approximation error in this context. Because an optimal strategy for a ﬁrm that unilaterally deviates from a
NOE strategy depends on the time period (since its competitors are using nonstationary strategies), we intro-
duce nonstationary Markov strategies. We deﬁne Mns = M1 and ns = 1 as the set of nonstationary
Markov strategies and entry rate functions, respectively. A nonstationary Markov strategy is a sequence of
Markov strategies. Hence, if  2 Mns is a nonstationary Markov strategy, then  = f0;1;:::g, where for
all t  0, t 2 M is a Markov strategy. Similarly, a nonstationary entry rate function is a sequence of entry
rate functions. Hence, if  2 ns is a nonstationary entry rate function, then  = f0;1;:::g where for all
t  0, t 2  is an entry rate function. For nonstationary Markov strategies 0; 2 Mns and nonstationary




k t ((xik;s i;k)   dik) + i ti;i

 xit = x;s i;t = s
#
;
where i is taken to be the index of a ﬁrm at quality level x at time t. In an abuse of notation, we will use
the shorthand, Vt(x;sj;)  Vt(x;sj;;). The nonstationary value function allows for dependence
on nonstationary Markov strategies. We use this value function to evaluate the actual expected discounted
proﬁts garner by a ﬁrm that uses a nonstationary Markov strategy. Suppose we are interested in the short-run
dynamic behavior of an industry that starts at state s 2 S. Let (~ ; ~ ) be a NOE. We quantify approximation









x;sj~ ; ~ 

:
Hence, approximation error is the amount by which a ﬁrm in state x with competitors in state s can improve
its expected discounted proﬁts by unilaterally deviating from the nonstationary oblivious strategy ~  to an
optimal nonstationary (non-oblivious) Markov strategy. We introduce our error bound. We denote [x]+ =
max(x;0) and x(k) = [x   kw]+.
Theorem 4.1. Let Assumptions A.1, A.2, and A.3 hold. Let ~  2 ~ Mns and ~  2 ~ ns be an s nonstationary





















(x0;s i;k)   (x0; ~ s(~ ;~ ;s);k)
+ 
 s i;0 = s
#





(xik; ~ s(~ ;~ ;s);k)   (xik;s i;k)
 
xi0 = x;s i;0 = s
#
:
The proofs can be found in the Appendix. Given a NOE, the error bound can be computed using
simulation. It requires simulating the industry evolution under NOE strategies starting from the initial
industry state s.3 It is worth mentioning that the result can be generalized a great deal. In particular, many
of the prior assumptions can be dropped; for instance, most alternative entry processes will not change the
result.
If the dynamics of the model include depreciation, that is, there is a positive probability the quality
level of the ﬁrm goes down even if investment is arbitrarily large, tighter bounds can be derived. Let
k(y;s) = (y;s)   (y; ~ s(~ ;~ ;s);k). Let ^  be a strategy such that the ﬁrm never exits the industry and
invests an inﬁnite amount at every state. We have the following result.
Theorem 4.2. Let Assumptions A.1, A.2, and A.3 hold. Let ~  2 ~ Mns and ~  2 ~ ns be an s nonstationary
obliviousequilibrium. Supposethat, foralls 2 S andforallk  0, thefunctionk(y;s)+ isnondecreasing














kE^ ;~ ;~ 
h
(xik;s i;k)   (xik; ~ s(~ ;~ ;s);k)
i+ 
 xi0 = x;s i;0 = s






(xik; ~ s(~ ;~ ;s);k)   (xik;s i;k)

 xi0 = x;s i;0 = s
#
:
Note that xit is controlled by strategy ^ , therefore, it is independent of everything else. If there is
depreciation and k(y;s)+ is nondecreasing in y, bound (4.2) is generally tighter than bound (4.1). The
latter takes a maximum over achievable states in the ﬁrst sum. The former takes an expectation with respect
to ^  and because of depreciation, larger achievable states have smaller weights, reducing the magnitude of
the bound.
3Note that under our assumptions, for all t > T, ~ st = ~ s, ~ t = ~ , and ~ t = ~ .
9The expectation over xik can be written in closed form for the model in Section 6.1 of Weintraub,
Benkard, and Van Roy (2008a) where ﬁrms can change their state by at most one quality level per time
period facilitating its computation.
Corollary 4.1. Let Assumptions A.1, A.2, and A.3 hold. Consider the industry model in Section 6.1 of
Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008a) where ﬁrms can change their state by at most one quality level
per time period. Let ~  2 ~ Mns and ~  2 ~ ns be an s nonstationary oblivious equilibrium. Suppose that,
































(xik; ~ s(~ ;~ ;s);k)   (xik;s i;k)
 




In this section we conduct some computational experiments to evaluate how NOE performs in practice.
In particular, we use NOE to analyze the short-run transitional industry dynamics from one long-run OE
to another after a proﬁt shock. More speciﬁcally, we compute OE for a given industry model. Then, we
increase the market size by 25% and compute the new OE. We compute a NOE that converges to the new OE
and for which the initial state is the original OE expected state. Figure 1 schematizes the industry evolution.
We use the same model as in Section 6 of Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008a). In Section 5.1 we
study the behavior of the error bound for different parameter speciﬁcations. In Section 5.2 we show the
different dynamics that NOE can generate.
5.1 Behavior of the Bound
Our ﬁrst set of results investigate the behavior of the approximation error bound under several different
model speciﬁcations. We use the same parameters as in Section 6.2 of Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy
(2008a) with the “almost deterministic” entry process. We consider two different values of 1 and the
investment cost d: (1;d) = (0:2; 0:2) and (1;d) = (0:7; 0:7). The former (“Low”) is a situation where
10the level of vertical differentiation is low and it is inexpensive to invest to improve quality. The latter
(“High”) is the opposite.
For each set of parameters, we compute a NOE where the starting state is the OE expected state.4 We
then use the approximation error bound in Theorem 4.2 to compute an upper bound on the percentage error
in the value function,
sup02Mns V0(x;sj0;~ ;~ ) V0(x;sj~ ;~ )
~ V0(xj;;s) , where (~ ; ~ ) are the NOE strategy and entry rate,
respectively.5 Percentage error is taken with respect to the nonstationary oblivious value function. We esti-
mate the expectations using simulation.6 We compute the previously mentioned percentage approximation
error bound for different market sizes. As the market size increases, the expected number of ﬁrms in the
original OE (and hence in the initial state) increases, and the approximation error bound decreases.
In Figure 2 (see Appendix) we present the percentage approximation error bound as a function of the
number of ﬁrms at the initial state for the two levels of vertical differentiation. For the low vertical differ-
entiation case it takes around 60 ﬁrms to bring the bound down to around 2%, and 200 ﬁrms to bring it to
around 1%. For the high case it takes around 100 ﬁrms to bring the bound to 3% and 200 ﬁrms to bring it to
2%.
Most economic applications would involve from less than ten to several hundred ﬁrms. These results
show that the approximation error bound may sometimes be small (<2%) in these cases, though this would
depend on the model and parameter values for the industry under study.
5.2 Short-Run Transitional Industry Dynamics
In this section we study transitional dynamics that NOE can generate. We consider the same model and
parameters as in the previous section with two variants: m = 750; 1 = 0:5; d = 0:5, and m = 1500; 1 =
2; d = 1.7 In the same spirit as above, we refer to the former as a case of low level of vertical differentiation,
and to the latter as a case of high level of vertical differentiation.
Figure 3 shows the evolution for the case of low level of vertical differentiation. First, note that because
the market size increases the new OE holds more ﬁrms than the original OE. Potential entrants realize
4We round fractional numbers in the OE expected state to the closest integer.
5While we are not able to show that k(y;s)
+ is nondecreasing in y, we check it computationally for all sampled states in the
simulation.
6The bound is estimated with a relative precision of at most 10% and a conﬁdence level of 98% (in cases where the bound is
very small it is difﬁcult to achieve better precision than this). Note that the percentage approximation error bound depends on the
state x so for the purposes of this section we consider the percentage bound evaluated at the entry state. For the computations we
took the maximum achievable state, xmax, to be a state such that the expected number of visits of a ﬁrm using the OE strategy was
at most 10
 5. In computing the bounds, we assumed that the maximum achievable state under the best response (non-oblivious)
strategy was also xmax.
7In the latter, we also included an additional noise term, it, to the ﬁrm’s evolution, which is independent of everything else. The
noise term allows for random appreciation and depreciation in the following way: P[it = 1] = 0:25; P[it = 0] = 0:5; P[it =
 1] = 0:25. The noise term generates richer dynamics.
11the existence of this proﬁtable opportunity and the NOE entry rate is high at the beginning. Then, after
approximately ten periods, it converges to the new OE entry rate. As a consequence, the NOE expected total
number of ﬁrms increases very quickly and in ﬁve periods is very close to converge to the new OE expected
total number of ﬁrms.
Figure 4 shows the evolution for the case of high level of vertical differentiation. Again, the new OE
holds more ﬁrms than the original, ﬁrms realize this proﬁtable opportunity and the NOE entry rate is high at
the beginning and then converges to the new OE entry rate. However, in this case there is “too much” entry
at the beginning. Because the level of vertical differentiation is high, becoming one of the largest ﬁrms in the
industry entails huge proﬁts and too many ﬁrms enter the industry hoping to become dominant. However,
only some of them receive favorable idiosyncratic shocks and the rest slowly starts exiting. Hence, after a
burst of entry the industry exhibits a shake-out until it converges to the new OE expected state.
In summary, NOE generates different dynamics depending on the model. In a case of low level of
vertical differentiation, the number of ﬁrms in the NOE increases and exhibits a quick convergence to the
new long-run OE. In a case of high level of vertical differentiation, the NOE exhibits too much entry at the
beginning and the industry exhibits a slow shake-out until it converges to the new long-run OE.
6 Asymptotic Theorem
In this section we establish an asymptotic result that provides conditions under which approximation error
converges to zero as the market size grows. The main condition is that the sequence of NOE generates ﬁrm
size distributions that are “light-tailed” in a sense that we will make precise. The result provides a theoretical
justiﬁcation for using NOE to approximate short-run industry dynamics.
The model in Section A does not explicitly depend on market size. However, market size would typ-
ically enter the proﬁt function, (xit;s i;t), through the underlying demand system; in particular, proﬁt
for a ﬁrm at a given state (x;s) would typically increase with market size. Therefore, in this section we
consider a sequence of markets indexed by market sizes m 2 <+. All other model primitives are assumed
to remain constant within this sequence except for the proﬁt function, which depends on m. To convey this
dependence, we denote proﬁt functions by m.
We index functions and random variables associated with market size m with a superscript (m). For our
asymptotic analysis, we consider a sequence of initial states ~ s
(m)





0 (x) = (m).8 Hence, the number of ﬁrms at ~ s
(m)
0 increases proportionally to the market
8In this notation f(m) = (m) means that there exists c1;c2 > 0 and m such that, c1m < f(m) < c2m, for all m > m.
12size asymptotically. We do not impose further restrictions on ~ s
(m)
0 ; for example, ~ s
(m)
0 could have ﬁrms at





t represent the nonstationary value function and nonstationary oblivious value function, respectively.
The random vector s
(m)
t denotes the industry state at time t when every ﬁrm uses strategy (m), the entry
rate function is (m), and the initial state is ~ s
(m)
0 . Note that s
(m)
0 = ~ s
(m)
0 .
It will be helpful to decompose s
(m)






t , where f
(m)
t is the random vec-
tor that represents the fraction of ﬁrms in each state, and n
(m)
















t denote the normalized expected industry state. With some abuse of notation, we deﬁne
m(xit;f i;t;n i;t)  m(xit;n i;t  f i;t).
6.1 Assumptions about the Sequence of Proﬁt Functions
In addition to Assumption A.1, which applies to individual proﬁt functions, we will make the following
assumptions, which apply to sequences of proﬁt functions. Let S1 = ff 2 Sj
P
x2N f(x) = 1g and
S1;z = ff 2 S1j8x > z;f(x) = 0g.
Assumption 6.1.











3. For all c > 0 and m 2 N, there exists a function  : N ! <+, such that, for all sequences n : N 7! N
satisfying n(m)  cm for all m > m,
sup
m2<+;f2S1
m(x;f;n(m))  (x);8x 2 N:









 xit = x
#
< 1:
4. For all z 2 N, there exists c > 0 and m 2 N, such that, if n(m) < cm and m > m, then,
m(xe;f;n(m)) > = + 1; 8f 2 S1;z:
Assumption6.1.1, whichstatesthatproﬁtsincreaseatmostlinearlywithmarketsize, shouldholdforvir-
tually all relevant classes of proﬁt functions. It is satisﬁed, for example, if the total disposable income of the
9In this notation, f(m) = O(m) denotes limsupm
f(m)
m < 1.
13consumer population grows linearly in market size.10 Assumption 6.1.2 requires that proﬁts are “smooth”
with respect to the number of ﬁrms and, in particular, states that the relative rate of change of proﬁt with
respect to relative changes in the number of ﬁrms is uniformly bounded. Roughly speaking, Assumption
6.1.3 states that if number of ﬁrms grow at least linearly with the market size, maximum achievable ex-
pected discounted proﬁts remain uniformly bounded over all market sizes. Assumption 6.1.4 states that if
the number of ﬁrms is smaller than a fraction of the market size and the market size is large, then ﬁrm’s
proﬁt at the entry state become large. The assumptions hold, for example, for a single-period proﬁt function
derived from a demand system given by a logit model where the spot market equilibrium is Nash in prices.
6.2 Asymptotic Nonstationary Markov Equilibrium Property
Our aim is to establish that, under certain conditions, NOE provides an accurate approximation as the market
size grows. Motivated by our deﬁnition of approximation error, we deﬁne the following concept to formalize
the sense in which this approximation becomes exact.
Deﬁnition 6.1. A sequence ((m);(m)) 2 Mns  ns possesses the asymptotic nonstationary Markov












0 j(m);(m)) = 0 :
6.3 A Light-Tail Condition Implies ANME
Even when there are a large number of ﬁrms, if the market tends to be concentrated — for example, if the
market is usually dominated by few ﬁrms — the ANME property is unlikely to hold. A strategy that does
not keep track of the dominant ﬁrms will perform poorly. To ensure the ANME property, we need to impose
a “light-tail” condition that rules out this kind of market concentration. In this section, we establish that
under an appropriate light-tail condition the sequence of NOE possesses the ANME property.
Note that
dlnm(y;f;n)
df(x) is the semi-elasticity of one period proﬁts with respect to the fraction of ﬁrms in











For each x, g(x) is the maximum rate of relative change of any ﬁrm’s single-period proﬁt that could result
10For example, if each consumer has income that is less than some upper bound Y then total disposable income of the consumer
population (an upper bound to ﬁrm proﬁts) is always less than m  Y .
14from a small change in the fraction of ﬁrms at quality level x. Since larger competitors tend to have greater
inﬂuence on ﬁrm proﬁts, g(x) typically increases with x, and can be unbounded.
Finally, we introduce our light-tail condition. For each m and t, let ~ x
(m)
t  ~ f
(m)
t , that is, ~ x
(m)
t is
a random variable with probability mass function ~ f
(m)
t . Recall that ~ f
(m)
t is a vector that represents the
normalized expected industry state at time t for market size m.











for all market sizes m, and all time periods t > 0.
Put simply, the light tail condition requires that the number of ﬁrms in states where a small change in the
fraction of ﬁrms has a large impact on the proﬁts of other ﬁrms, must be relatively small in the sequence of
expected states. In practice this typically means that very large ﬁrms (and hence high concentration) rarely
occur when the industry starts from the chosen initial state.11
In Assumption 2.1, for each market size, we established an upper bound for entry rates, max. This
upper bound can vary with the market size. In the next assumption, we establish that the upper bound on
entry rates 
(m)
max grows at the same rate as the market size asymptotically. The assumption simpliﬁes our
asymptotic analysis.






In the next result, we establish that, for all time periods, the expected number of ﬁrms grows at least
linearly in the market size asymptotically.
Proposition 6.1. Let Assumptions A.1, A.2, A.3, 6.1.4, 6.2, and 6.3 hold. Then, there exists c > 0 and m,
such that, for all t > 0 and for all m > m, ~ n
(m)
t =m  c.
All proofs of this section can be found in the Appendix. The result implies that if the light-tail condition
is satisﬁed, then the expected number of ﬁrms under NOE strategies in each time period grows to inﬁnity as
the market size grows.
11Note that the quality level z in the light-tail assumption above is the same for all market sizes m and time periods t. The results
in this section allow for any sequence of NOE. We conjecture that if we constraint the results to sequences of NOE that become
stationary as time progresses (Section 2.3), then we could weaken the light-tail assumption and allow z to vary with t. Also note
that the light tail condition is not assumed at t = 0; we do not need that condition to prove our results because at the initial period
there is no uncertaity about the industry state.











t   ~ f
(m)
t k1;g !p 0, as m grows.12
The light-tail condition is key to prove the second part of the result, namely, convergence of the normal-
ized industry states in the k  k1;g weighted-norm. We also note that this part of the result requires a very
different proof technique to its analog for OE in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008b). This form of
convergence allows us to ensure the ANME property, which leads to the main result of this section.
Theorem 6.1. Under Assumptions A.1, A.2, A.3, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 the sequence f(m);(m)g of NOE pos-
sesses the ANME property.
7 Closing Remarks
In this paper we introduced nonstationary oblivious equilibrium as a way to approximate short-run tran-
sitional dynamics that may result, for example, from shocks or policy changes. We provided an efﬁcient
algorithm to compute NOE and an efﬁcient simulation-based algorithm to compute a bound on approxi-
mation error. The algorithm for bounding approximation error allow us to verify accuracy of NOE as an
approximation for each problem instance. Using these methods, we provided a computational study and
showed that NOE offers useful approximations for relevant models of industries with hundreds or even tens
of ﬁrms. We also showed that NOE can endogenously generate interesting industry dynamics, like industry
shake-outs. Our results show that by using NOE it is possible to further expand the set of dynamic industries
that can be analyzed computationally.
While the previous results provide support for using NOE in practice, we also provided an asymptotic
result that provides a theoretical justiﬁcation for the approximation. We showed that, if alongside some
technical requirements, the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrm states obeys certain “light-tail” condition, then
the approximation error vanishes as the market sizes grows.
The previous result suggests that OE and NOE will not provide accurate approximations for industries
with few dominant ﬁrms that have a signiﬁcant market share. In Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007)
we develop an extended notion of nonstationary oblivious equilibrium that allows for there to be a set of
12We use !p to denote convergence in probability.
16“dominant ﬁrms”, whose ﬁrm states are always monitored by every other ﬁrm. Our hope is that the dominant
ﬁrm nonstationary OE will provide better approximations for more concentrated industries. Testing these
approximations in empirical applications is the matter of current and future research.
A A Dynamic Model of Imperfect Competition
In this section we formulate a model of an industry in which ﬁrms compete in a single-good market. The
model is general enough to encompass numerous applied problems in economics. Indeed, a blossoming
recent literature on EP-type models has applied similar models to advertising, auctions, collusion, consumer
learning, environmental policy, international trade policy, learning-by-doing, limit order markets, mergers,
network externalities, and other applied problems.
Our model is close in spirit to that of Ericson and Pakes (1995), but with some differences. Most notably,
we modify the entry and exit processes in Ericson and Pakes (1995) so as to make them more realistic when
there are a large number of ﬁrms. Additionally, the asymptotic theorem in this paper does not hold when
there are aggregate industry shocks, so our model includes only idiosyncratic shocks.13
A.1 Model and Notation
The industry evolves over discrete time periods and an inﬁnite horizon. We index time periods with non-
negative integers t 2 N (N = f0;1;2;:::g). All random variables are deﬁned on a probability space
(
;F;P) equipped with a ﬁltration fFt : t  0g. We adopt a convention of indexing by t variables that are
Ft-measurable.
Each ﬁrm that enters the industry is assigned a unique positive integer-valued index. The set of indices
of incumbent ﬁrms at time t is denoted by St. At each time t 2 N, we denote the number of incumbent ﬁrms
as nt.
Firm heterogeneity is reﬂected through ﬁrm states. To ﬁx an interpretation, we will refer to a ﬁrm’s state
as its quality level. However, ﬁrm states might more generally reﬂect productivity, capacity, the size of its
consumer network, or any other aspect of the ﬁrm that affects its proﬁts. At time t, the quality level of ﬁrm
i 2 St is denoted by xit 2 N.
We deﬁne the industry state st to be a vector over quality levels that speciﬁes, for each quality level
x 2 N, the number of incumbent ﬁrms at quality level x in period t. We deﬁne the state space S =






x=0 s(x) < 1
o
. Though in principle there are a countable number of industry states, we will







x=0 s(x) < 1
o
. This will allow us, for example,
to consider derivatives of functions with respect to the industry state. For each i 2 St, we deﬁne s i;t 2 S
to be the state of the competitors of ﬁrm i; that is, s i;t(x) = st(x)   1 if xit = x, and s i;t(x) = st(x),
otherwise. Similarly, n i;t denotes the number of competitors of ﬁrm i.
In each period, each incumbent ﬁrm earns proﬁts on a spot market. A ﬁrm’s single period expected
proﬁt (xit;s i;t) depends on its quality level xit and its competitors’ state s i;t.
The model also allows for entry and exit. In each period, each incumbent ﬁrm i 2 St observes a positive
real-valued sell-off value it that is private information to the ﬁrm. If the sell-off value exceeds the value of
continuing in the industry then the ﬁrm may choose to exit, in which case it earns the sell-off value and then
ceases operations permanently.
If the ﬁrm instead decides to remain in the industry, then it can invest to improve its quality level. If a
ﬁrm invests it 2 <+, then the ﬁrm’s state at time t + 1 is given by,
xi;t+1 = max(0;xit + w(it;i;t+1));
where the function w captures the impact of investment on quality and i;t+1 reﬂects uncertainty in the
outcome of investment. Uncertainty may arise, for example, due to the risk associated with a research and
development endeavor or a marketing campaign. Note that this speciﬁcation is very general as w may take
on either positive or negative values (e.g., allowing for positive depreciation). We denote the unit cost of
investment by d.
In each period new ﬁrms can enter the industry by paying a setup cost . Entrants do not earn proﬁts
in the period that they enter. They appear in the following period at state xe 2 N and can earn proﬁts
thereafter.14
Each ﬁrm aims to maximize expected net present value. The interest rate is assumed to be positive and
constant over time, resulting in a constant discount factor of  2 (0;1) per time period.
In each period, events occur in the following order:
1. Each incumbent ﬁrms observes its sell-off value and then makes exit and investment decisions.
2. The number of entering ﬁrms is determined and each entrant pays an entry cost of .
3. Incumbent ﬁrms compete in the spot market and receive proﬁts.
4. Exiting ﬁrms exit and receive their sell-off values.
14Note that it would not change any of our results to assume that the entry state was a random variable.
185. Investment outcomes are determined, new entrants enter, and the industry takes on a new state st+1.
A.2 Model Primitives
Our model above allows for a wide variety of applied problems. To study any particular problem it is
necessary to further specify the primitives of the model, including the proﬁt function , the distribution of
the sell-off value it, the investment impact function w, the distribution of the investment uncertainty it,
the unit investment cost d, the entry cost , and the discount factor .
Note that in most applications the proﬁt function would not be speciﬁed directly, but would instead result
from a deeper set of primitives that specify a demand function, a cost function, and a static equilibrium
concept. An important parameter of the demand function (and hence the proﬁt function) that we will focus
on below, is the size of the relevant market, which we will denote as m. Later on in the paper we subscript
the proﬁt function with the market size parameter, m, to explicitly recognize the dependence of proﬁts on
market size. For expositional clarity, the subscript is omitted in the assumptions listed below, implying that
the market size is being held ﬁxed.
A.3 Assumptions
We make several assumptions about the model primitives, beginning with the proﬁt function. An industry




zx s0(z). We will denote this
relation by s  s0. Intuitively, competition associated with s is no weaker than competition associated with
s0.
Assumption A.1.
1. For all s 2 S, (x;s) is increasing in x.
2. For all x 2 N and s;s0 2 S, if s  s0 then (x;s)  (x;s0).
3. For all x 2 N and s 2 S, (x;s) > 0, and supx;s (x;s) < 1.
4. For all x 2 N, the function ln(x;:) : S ! <+ is continuously Fr´ echet differentiable. Hence, for all
x 2 N, y 2 N, and s 2 S, ln(x;s) is continuously differentiable with respect to s(y). Further, for
any x 2 N, s 2 S, and h 2 S such that s + 
h 2 S for 




























19The assumptions are fairly weak. Assumption A.1.1 ensures that increases in quality lead to increases in
proﬁt. Assumption A.1.2 states that strengthened competition cannot result in increased proﬁt. Assumption
A.1.3 ensures that proﬁts are positive and bounded. Assumption A.1.4 is technical and requires that log-
proﬁts are Fr´ echet differentiable. Note that it requires partial differentiability of the proﬁt function with
respect to each s(y). Proﬁt functions that are “smooth”, such as ones arising from random utility demand
models like the logit model, will satisfy this assumption.
We also make assumptions about investment and the distributions of the private shocks:
Assumption A.2.
1. The random variables fitjt  0;i  1g are i.i.d. and have ﬁnite expectations and well-deﬁned
density functions with support <+.
2. The random variables fitjt  0;i  1g are i.i.d. and independent of fitjt  0;i  1g.
3. For all , w(;) is nondecreasing in .
4. For all  > 0, P[w(;i;t+1) > 0] > 0.
5. There exists a positive constant w 2 N such that jw(;)j  w, for all (;). There exists a positive
constant  such that it < ; 8i;8t.
6. For all k 2 f w;:::;wg, P[w(;i;t+1) = k] is continuous in .
7. The transitions generated by w(;) are unique investment choice admissible .
Again the assumptions are natural and fairly weak. Assumptions 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 imply that investment
and exit outcomes are idiosyncratic conditional on the state. Assumptions 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 imply that in-
vestment is productive. Note that positive depreciation is neither required nor ruled out. Assumption 3.2.5
places a ﬁnite bound on how much progress can be made or lost in a single period through investment. As-
sumption 3.2.6 ensures that the impact of investment on transition probabilities is continuous. Assumption
3.2.7 is an assumption introduced by Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007) that ensures a unique solution to
the ﬁrms’ investment decision problem. It is used to guarantee existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies,
and is satisﬁed by many of the commonly used speciﬁcations in the literature.
We assume that there are a large number of potential entrants who play a symmetric mixed entry strategy.
In that case the number of actual entrants is well approximated by the Poisson distribution (see the appendix
for a derivation of this result). This leads to the following assumptions:
Assumption A.3.
1. The number of ﬁrms entering during period t is a Poisson random variable that is conditionally
independent of fit;itjt  0;i  1g, conditioned on st.
2.  > , where  is the expected net present value of entering the market, investing zero and earning
zero proﬁts each period, and then exiting at an optimal stopping time.
20We denote the expected number of ﬁrms entering at industry state st, by (st). This state-dependent
entry rate will be endogenously determined, and our solution concept will require that it satisﬁes a zero
expected discounted proﬁts condition. Modeling the number of entrants as a Poisson random variable has
the advantage that it leads to more elegant asymptotic results. Assumption 3.3.2 ensures that the sell-off
value by itself is not sufﬁcient reason to enter the industry.
B Proof Theorem 2.1
B.1 Preliminaries







x=0 s(x) < N
o
.15 We
endowed the set S with a metric for which single-period proﬁt functions are continuous for all s 2 S.16
We deﬁne a set S1 = f(s0;s1;s2;:::) : st 2 S; for which there exists s 2 S;limt!1 st = sg,
endowed with the metric compatible with the product topology.17 The elements of S1 are denoted by
S = fs0;s1;:::g.
We deﬁne a new set of strategies MS : N \ [0;xmax]  S1 ! [0;^ ]  [0;supx;s (x;s)=(1   ) + ].
Similarly, in an abuse of notation, for all  2 MS, x 2 N \ [0;xmax] and S 2 S1, we deﬁne a new value
function,
V (x;Sj) = E
" i X
k=0
k ((xik;sk)   dik) + i ti;i

 xi0 = x
#
:
Let V (x;S) = sup2MS V (x;Sj); 8x 2 N \ [0;xmax]; 8S 2 S1. Note that the state space of this
dynamic programming problem is uncountable. However, because single-period proﬁts, investments, and
expected sell-off value are bounded, the supremum can always be attained simultaneously for all x and S
by a common strategy  (Bertsekas (2001)).
We deﬁne a translation operator G : S1 ! S1, such that, G(S) = fs1;s2;:::g.
We deﬁne the following Bellman operator:






( d + E [V (xi;t+1;G(S))jxit = x;it = ])
)#
;
for all x 2 N \ [0;xmax] and s 2 S1.
15Under our assumptions, this restriction is done without loss of generality for N large enough.
16In general, in our case this is the metric deﬁned by the k  k1;g norm. Since now we are restricting the state space to be ﬁnite
dimensional, single period proﬁts are continuous in any norm.
17Note that limt!1 st = s is deﬁned with the metric for which single-period proﬁt functions are continuous for all s 2 S.
21We deﬁne  : N \ [0;xmax]  S1 ! <+ as the greedy policy with respect to V . That is,





V (xi;t+1;G(S))jxit = x;it = 

:
By assumption A.2, (x;S) exists and is unique for all x 2 N \ [0;xmax] and s 2 S1. We also deﬁne the
exit strategy  : N \ [0;xmax]  S1 ! <+ as





V (xi;t+1;G(S))jxit = x;it = 

:
Finally, we denote (x;S) = ((x;S);(x;S)).
For all  2 ^ Mns and  2 ^ ns we deﬁne the following operator:
H1(;) = (fstg1
t=0;), where
(B.4) st+1 = stPt + 1xet;
s0 is the initial state in the NOE, and 1x(y) = 1, if y = x and 1x(y) = 0, otherwise.
The ﬁrst component of the operator H1 maps a sequence of strategies and entry rates into a sequence of
expected states. The second component applies the identity to the sequence of entry rates.
For all S 2 S1 and  2 ^ ns, we deﬁne the following operator
H2(S;) =

(;Gt(S));maxf0;minft + V (xe;Gt+1(S))   ;maxgg
	1
t=0 :
The operator H2 maps a sequence of states S and entry rates  into a sequence of optimal strategies and
updated entry rates.
B.2 Outline of Proof
We prove Theorem 2.1 at the end of the section. In Section B.3, we prove useful lemmas. We provide
an outline here. For  2 ^ Mns and  2 ^ ns, deﬁne the operator H(;) = H2  H1(;). Note that a
ﬁxed point of H is a NOE. The proof uses Brouwer-Schauder-Tychonoff’s theorem (Aliprantis and Border
(2006)) to show that a ﬁxed point of H exists in ^ Mns  ^ ns. The main steps of the proof are the following:
1. Prove that H1 is a continuous operator (Lemma B.1).
222. Prove that H2 is a continuous operator (Lemma B.4).
3. Prove that H2  H1 maps elements from ^ Mns  ^ ns into itself (Lemmas B.1 and B.4 together).
4. Show that if NOE strategies and entry rates converge as time progresses, they converge to OE strate-
gies and entry rate.
B.3 Lemmas
The assumptions in Theorem 2.1 hold throughout this section.
Lemma B.1. The operator H1 maps elements from ^ Mns  ^ ns into S1  ^ ns and is continuos.
Proof. First, we prove that the ﬁrst component of H1 maps elements from ^ Mns^  into S1, that is, fstg1
t=0
in equation (B.4) is a converging sequence.
Note that because proﬁts are bounded and it has support in <+, there is a probability uniformly
bounded away from zero over all strategies  2 ^ Mns, states x 2 N \ [0;xmax], and time periods t 2 N,
of exiting the industry at each time. Therefore, for all  2 ^ Mns, supt0  (Pt) < 1, where (P) is the
spectral radius of the matrix P.
Now,
















Note that because  (P~ ) < 1,
lim
t!1
~ st = ~ 1xe(I   P~ ) 1 = ~ s :
We have that,














Let  > 0. Because supt0  (Pt) < 1:





































































Therefore, for t > T we have that,




















































Note that the sum has s terms, for all t. Additionally, limt!1 i = ~ , and limt!1 Pt = P~ , because P
is continuous in . Therefore,
lim
t!1
kst   ~ stk <  :
Take  ! 0 to conclude that limt!1 kst   ~ stk = 0, and hence, limt!1 st = ~ s.
Finally, by equation (B.5), st is continuous because P is continuos in . Hence, H1 is continuos.
Now, we show that the operator H2 is continuos. First, we show some preliminary lemmas.
Lemma B.2. The transition operator G is continuous on S1.
Proof. Consider the sequence fSk 2 S1 : k  0g, such that limk!1 Sk = S 2 S1. Therefore,
limk!1 sk
t = st, for all t  0. In particular, the latter holds for t  1. Therefore, limk!1 G(Sk) = G(S).
The result follows.
Lemma B.3. The value function V is the unique solution of Bellman’s equation V = TV within the class
of bounded functions. Moreover, V and  are continuous in the metric compatible with the product topology
in N \ [0;xmax]  S1.
24Proof. Because single-period proﬁts, investments, and expected sell-off value are bounded, V is the unique
solution of Bellman’s equation V = TV within the class of bounded functions (Bertsekas (2001)). We use
the contraction mapping theorem to prove that, additionally, V is continuous in the metric compatible with
the product topology in N\[0;xmax]S1. In particular, we show that T has a ﬁxed point within the class
of bounded and continuous functions. Because the ﬁxed point is V , V is continous.
Let Cb(N \ [0;xmax]  S1;<) be the space of continuous and bounded real-valued functions with
domain N \ [0;xmax]  S1. Recall that Cb(N \ [0;xmax]  S1;<) is a complete metric space with the
metric deﬁned by the supremum norm (Marsden and Hoffman (1993)). Also, recall that T is a contraction
in the supremum norm because  < 1 (Bertsekas (2001)). Now, we show that T maps elements from
Cb(N \ [0;xmax]  S1;<) into Cb(N \ [0;xmax]  S1;<).
Take a function V 2 Cb(N \ [0;xmax]  S1;<). By deﬁnition (B.1)






( d + E [V (xi;t+1;G(S))jxit = x;it = ])
)#
:
By Lemma B.2, the operator G is continuos. The proﬁt function  and the value function V are continuos.
By assumption A.2, ( d + E [V (xi;t+1;G(S))jxit = x;it = ]) is continuos in  and V , and the random
variable it is absolutely continuos. Moreover  is optimized over a compact space. By Berge’s Maximum
Theorem, TV (x;S) is continuos. Moreover, TV is bounded because proﬁts, investments, and expected sell-
off value are uniformly bounded over allstates. Therefore, T maps elements fromCb(N\[0;xmax]S1;<)
into Cb(N \ [0;xmax]  S1;<).
Using the contraction mapping theorem (Marsden and Hoffman (1993)), we conclude that T has a
ﬁxed point among the class of continuous and bounded functions, therefore, V is continous. Using Berge’s
Maximum Theorem again, we conclude that  and  are also continuous.
Lemma B.4. The operator H2 maps elements from S1  ^ ns into ^ Mns  ^ ns, and is continuous.
Proof. ByLemmasB.2andB.3, foreacht  0,

(;Gt(S));maxf0;minft + V (xe;Gt+1(S))   ;maxgg
	
is continous in (S;). Hence, H2 is continuous.
Now, limt!1 Gt(S) = fs;s;s;:::g, for some s 2 S, because S 2 S1. Hence, using the continuity of
 (Lemma B.3), limt!1 (;Gt(S)) = , for some  2 ~ M. By a similar argument, the second component
of H2 also converges. Hence, H2 maps elements from S1  ^ ns into ^ Mns  ^ ns.
25B.4 Proof Theorem 2.1
Proof. Because the range of  2 ~ M and  2 ~ M are bounded, by Tychonoff Theorem (Royden (1988)),
^ Mns  ^ ns is a compact set with the product topology. It is also a convex set and a subset of a locally
convex Haussdorff space.
By Lemmas B.1 and B.4, H is a continuos operator that maps elements from ^ Mns  ^ ns into itself.
Hence, by Brouwer-Schauder-Tychonoff’ theorem, there exists a ﬁxed point (;) of H in the set ^ Mns 
^ ns. The ﬁxed point is a NOE, such that, for all x, limt!1 t(x) = ~ (x) and limt!1 t = ~ .
To ﬁnish the proof we show that (~ ; ~ ) 2 M   is an OE. Using the argument in Lemma B.1,
it is straightforward to show that the sequence S in the ﬁrst component of H1(;) converges to ~ s =
1xe~ (I   P~ )
 1, the long-run expected state under oblivious strategy and entry rate (~ ; ~ ). By Lemma
B.4, t() = (;Gt(S)). Taking limt!1, using the fact that limt!1 Gt(S) = f~ s; ~ s;:::g, and that  is
continuous (Lemma B.3), we conclude that ~ () is an OE strategy. Because V is continuous (Lemma B.3),
the associated OE value function is V (x;f~ s; ~ s;:::g). Because  is a ﬁxed point of H and taking limt!1, if
~  = 0, then V (xe;f~ s; ~ s;:::g)  0. Similarly, if ~  > 0, then V (xe;f~ s; ~ s;:::g) = . Therefore, ~  is an OE
entry rate. The result follows.
C Proofs Section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.1. First, let us write,
V0





















x;sj~ ; ~ 

: (C.1)
Because ~  and ~  attain an s nonstationary oblivious equilibrium, for all x,
~ V0













xj0; ~ ; ~ ;s

;
where the last equation follows because there will always be an optimal nonstationary oblivious strategy
when optimizing a nonstationary oblivious value function even if we consider more general strategies. Let
26 2 Mns be such that sup02Mns V0





x;sj; ~ ; ~ 

, for all x 2 N. We have,
(C.2) V0













(xik;s i;k)   (xik; ~ s(~ ;~ ;s);k)
 
xi0 = x;s i;0 = s
#
:
Competitors of ﬁrm i are using nonstationary oblivious strategies, therefore, their evolution is not affected
by ﬁrm i’s evolution. Hence,
(C.3) V0

















(x0;s i;k)   (x0; ~ s(~ ;~ ;s);k)
+ 
 s i;0 = s
#
:
On the other hand,
(C.4) ~ V0













(xik; ~ s(~ ;~ ;s);k)   (xik;s i;k)
 
xi0 = x;s i;0 = s
#
:
The result follows by expressions (C.1), (C.3), and (C.4).
Proof of Theorem 4.2. By equation (C.2):
V0













(xik;s i;k)   (xik; ~ s(~ ;~ ;s);k)
 
xi0 = x;s i;0 = s
#
:
Competitors of ﬁrm i are using nonstationary oblivious strategies, therefore, their evolution is not affected
by ﬁrm i’s evolution. Using this fact and a similar argument to Theorem 5.2 in Weintraub, Benkard, and
Van Roy (2008a) we obtain:
(C.5) V0










kE^ ;~ ;~ 
h
(xik;s i;k)   (xik; ~ s(~ ;~ ;s);k)
i+ 

xi0 = x;s i;0 = s

27The result of the proof is analogous to Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. The proof is analogous to Theorem 4.2, but uses a similar argument to Corollary
B.1 in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008a) to obtain:
(C.6) V0





xj~ ; ~ ;s







(xik;s i;k)   (xik; ~ s(~ ;~ ;s);k)
i+  


















D Proofs Section 6
Let `1;g = ff 2 <1
+ j kfk1;g < 1g. With some abuse of notation, let S1;g = S1 \ `1;g.
D.1 Proof of Proposition 6.1
Proof of Proposition 6.1. It is simple to show that Assumption A.1.4 implies that, for all f;f0 2 S1;g, and
m;n 2 <+ (see Lemma A.6 in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008b))
jlnm(xe;f;n)   lnm(xe;f0;n)j  kf   f0k1;g:







t ; ~ n
(m)
t )   lnm(xe; ^ f; ~ n
(m)
t )j  :
Therefore, for all m 2 <+;t > 0, there exists ^ f
(m)
t 2 S1;z, such that,
(D.1) exp( )m(xe; ^ f
(m)
t ; ~ n
(m)
t )  m(xe; ~ f
(m)
t ; ~ n
(m)
t ):
Assumption 6.1.4 implies that there exists c1 > 0 and m1 2 N, such that, if ~ n
(m)
t < c1m and m > m1,
28then,
(D.2) m(xe; ^ f
(m)






Assumption 6.3 implies that there exists c2 > 0 and m2 such that, 
(m)
max > c2m, for all m > m2. Let
m = maxfm1;m2g and c = minfc1;c2g. We show that the proposition holds for c and m given by these
quantities.
Let us assume for contradiction that there exists t > 0 and m > m, such that, ~ n
(m)
t =m < c. We need to








max > cm by Assumption 6.3 and
we arrive to a contradiction.










0 )     0:
By equations (D.1) and (D.2), for  sufﬁciently small


< m(xe; ~ f
(m)
t ; ~ n
(m)





contradicting the zero expected value condition. The result follows.
D.2 Proof of Proposition 6.2
We start by proving some preliminary lemmas.
Lemma D.1. Let X be a binomial random variable with parameters (p;n). Then,













where q = ln(1 + ).





where q = ln(1   ).
Proof. The case p = 0 is trivial. Suppose 0 < p  1.
We use the following inequalities that are easy to show:
(D.5) (1 + x)log(1 + x)   x > 0 and (1   x)log(1   x) + x > 0;8x 2 (0;1):










q(1 + )  
1
p
log(1   p + peq)

Note that 1
p log(1 + (eq   1)p) is decreasing in p, for all q. Its derivative has the opposite sign to
(1 + (eq   1)p)log(1 + (eq   1)p)   (eq   1)p > 0:
So using that limp!0
1
p log(1   p + peq) = exp(q)   1 we have that:
q(1 + )  
1
p
log(1   p + peq)  q(1 + )   exp(q) + 1;8p 2 (0;1]; 8q 2 <:
The right-hand side of the above inequality is maximizied at q = ln(1 + ) and its maximum is C1 =
(1 + )ln(1 + )    > 0, which is positive by equation (D.5). Inequality (D.3) then follows.










q(1   )  
1
p
log(1   p + peq)

;
and choose q = log(1   ) and C2 = (1   )log(1   ) +  > 0.
Lemma D.2. Let Assumptions A.1, A.2, A.3, 6.1.4, 6.2, and 6.3 hold. Then, for all  > 0, there exists c > 0


















30Proof. Let Bxt be a binomial random variable that represents the number of ﬁrms that at the initial period
were at quality level x and are still inside the industry at time period t. Let Ykt be a random variable that
represents the number of ﬁrms that entered the industry at time period 0 < k  t and are still inside the
industry at time period t. Because entry at every time period t  1 is represented by a Poisson random
variable and ﬁrms’ trajectories are independent (because they use NOE strategies), we have that Ykt is
Poisson. Let Yt =
Pt
k=1 Ykt. The random variable Yt is Poisson because it is a sum of independent Poisson





where each random variable Bxt is binomial and Yt is Poisson. Moreover, these random variables are




0 (x) < 1, hence, the sum above has a ﬁnite number














































Now, using Lemma D.1 and a similar analysis for the Poisson distribution based on the moment generating



































Now, by Proposition 6.1, there exists C2 > 0 and m, such that, for all m > m and t > 0, ~ n
(m)
t  C2m.









  1  
!
 exp( cm):
18The same constant C1 as in inequality (D.3) serves to bound the term corresponding to the Poisson random variable.











. The result follows by putting together both
bounds.




t follows from Lemma D.2. To complete the proof,
we will establish convergence of kf
(m)
t   ~ f
(m)
t k1;g, for all t > 0. Note that for any z 2 N,
kf
(m)
t   ~ f
(m)





















where we have omitted the dependence on t to simplify notation. We will show that for any z, A
(m)
z
converges in probability to zero, that for any  > 0, for sufﬁciently large z, limm!1 P[C
(m)
z  ] = 0, and
that for any  > 0 and  > 0, for sufﬁciently large z, limsupm!1 P[B
(m)
z  ]  =. The assertion that
kf
(m)
t   ~ f
(m)
t k1;g !p 0 follows from these facts.
By Assumption 6.2, for any  > 0, for sufﬁciently large z, limsupm!1 C
(m)
z < , and therefore,
limm!1 P[C
(m)
z  ] = 0. By Tonelli’s Theorem, E[B
(m)
z ] = C
(m)
z . Invoking Markov’s inequality, for
any  > 0 and  > 0, for sufﬁciently large z, limsupm!1 P[B
(m)
z  ]  =.
To ﬁnish the proof we show that for any z, A
(m)
z converges in probability to zero. In particular, we show
that, for all x, jf
(m)
t (x)   ~ f
(m)
t (x)j !p 0 using mathematical induction. First, note that the result holds for
t = 0 because ~ f
(m)
0 (x) = f
(m)
0 (x) (recall that at t = 0, s
(m)
0 = ~ s
(m)
0 ). To complete our inductive argument,
we now show that jf
(m)
k (x)   ~ f
(m)
k (x)j !p 0; 8x, implies jf
(m)
k+1(x)   ~ f
(m)

































k (y) is the total number of ﬁrms after exit decisions have been realized (and before new









is the fraction of ﬁrms at time k in state y after exit decisions
have been realized; e
(m)
k is the number of entrants at time k + 1 in market m; ^ p
(m)
k (y;x) is the probability
of transitioning from state y to state x conditional on staying in the industry; and 1fg is the indicator
function. Let p
(m)
k (y) be the probability of staying in the industry for a ﬁrm in state y in market m in
time period k, and p
(m)










. Note that this conditional probability is well deﬁned for all m;k;x;y, because by











k (x)  ~ f
(m)
k+1(x)j. Therefore
it sufﬁces to show that every term at the right hand side of the inequality goes to zero in probability as the
market size grows.



























k (y); ^ p
(m)
k (y;x)g. For any  > 0,
conditional on ^ f
(m)


























































where the ﬁrst inequality follows by Chebyshev’s inequality. Integrating over ^ f
(m)






























k+1 !p 1 and ~ n
(m)
k+1 ! 1 (Proposition 6.1) it must be that n
(m)
k+1 !p 1. Therefore,
1=n
(m)














k (x)j !p 0.
Now, we show that jD
(m)
k (x)   ~ f
(m)























Suppose x 6= xe. Then, by the triangle inequality,
jD
(m)

































































































iky are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with mean p
(m)
k (y) that are equal to one if ﬁrm i at state
y stays inside the industry at time period k in market m. We consider two cases:
(i) Suppose liminfm!1 ~ f
(m)
k (y) > 0. Because jf
(m)
k (y)   ~ f
(m)
k (y)j !p 0 by the inductive hypothe-
sis and n
(m)
k !p 1, one can check that in this case s
(m)
k (y) !p 1. Then, it is simple to verify























k+1) !p 1. Also, jf
(m)
k (y)  ~ f
(m)
k (y)j !p 0 by





remains uniformly bounded from above over all market sizes. The previous convergence results to-
gether with the latter uniform bound imply that (D.7)!p 0.
(ii) Suppose liminfm!1 ~ f
(m)
k (y) = 0. For a subsequence for which limr!1 ~ f
(mr)
k (y) > 0, we can
apply argument (i). Now, we consider a subsequence for which limr!1 ~ f
(mr)
k (y) = 0. Consid-













k+1 = 0. Now, jf
(m)
k (y)   ~ f
(m)



















k+1) !p 1. These facts with
















iky !p 0. We conclude that
(D.7)!p 0.












































 !p 0. Using Chebyshev’s inequality and the fact that e
(m)





















Hence, for all x, jf
(m)
t (x)   ~ f
(m)
t (x)j !p 0, concluding the proof.
D.3 Proof of Theorem 6.1
We start by proving some preliminary lemmas.















  xit = x
#
< 1:
Proof. Take c > 0 and m given by Proposition 6.1. Using Assumption 6.1.3 and the fact that for all m > m
and t > 0, ~ n
(m)





























The following technical lemma follows immediately from Assumption 6.1.3. We omit the proof.
Lemma D.4. Let Assumptions A.1.3 and 6.1.2 hold. Then, for all  > 0 there exists  > 0 such that for all





m(x;f;n)   m(x;f; ^ n)
m(x;f; ^ n)
 
   :
Lemma D.5. Let Assumptions A.1, A.2, A.3, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 hold. Then, for all sequences f^ (m) 2 Mnsg













  xi0 = x;s
(m)





Proof. For the purpose of this proof, we will assume that all expectations are conditioned on xi0 = x and
s
(m)
 i;0 = ~ s
(m)








t )j. Fix  > 0 and let  > 0 satisfy the
assertion of Lemma D.4. Let Z
(m)








  . Applying Tonelli’s Theorem and
35noting that s
(m)











































































where the second to last inequality follows from Assumption 6.1.1 and Lemma D.4. By Lemma D.2, there
exist constants c;m such that P[Z
(m)
k ]  2e cm, for all k > 0 and m > m. Hence, the second sum above
converges to zero. Moreover,  is arbitrary and the expected sum in the ﬁrst term is uniformly bounded over
all market sizes (by Lemma D.3). The result follows.
The following technical lemma is proved in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008b).
Lemma D.6. Let Assumptions A.1.3 and A.1.4 hold. Then, for all  > 0 there exists  > 0 such that for












Lemma D.7. Let Assumptions A.1, A.2, A.3, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 hold. Then, for all sequences f^ (m) 2 Mnsg














 xi0 = x;s
(m)





Proof. For the purpose of this proof, we will assume that all expectations are conditioned on xi0 = x and
s
(m)
 i;0 = ~ s
(m)






t )   m(xit; ~ s
(m)
t )j. Fix  > 0 and let  satisfy the assertion
of Lemma D.6. Let Z
(m)
t denote the event kf
(m)
t   ~ f
(m)
t k1;g  . Applying Tonelli’s Theorem and noting
36that s
(m)























































for some constant C > 0. The last inequality follows from Lemmas D.3 and D.6.
Note that 
(m)


























































because sup2Mns is attained by an oblivious strategy, so f
(m)
 i;k evolves independently from xik. Assump-






























< 1. Moreover, by Proposition
6.2, for all k  1, P(Z
(m)
k ) ! 0 as m ! 1. Then by the dominated convergence theorem (D.9)!m 0.
Finally,  in (D.8) is arbitrary. The result follows.





















0 j(m);(m))  0:
The ANME property, which we set out to establish, asserts that for all x 2 N, limm!1 ^ V (m)(x) = 0.





0 ) = sup












where the last equation follows because there will always be an optimal nonstationary oblivious strategy
when optimizing a nonstationary oblivious value function even if we consider more general strategies. It
follows that
















































 A(m)(x) + B(m)(x):





 i;t)   m(xit; ~ s
(m)









































k )   m(xik; ~ s
(m)
k )j:
The result therefore follows from Lemmas D.5 and D.7.
E Figures





Figure 2: Percentage approximation error bound for different market sizes.
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